Creat membership Creat membership
Sign in

Forgot password?

Confirm
  • Forgot password?
    Sign Up
  • Confirm
    Sign In
home > search

Now showing items 1 - 10 of 10

  • Water scarcity and rioting:Disaggregated evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

    Almer, Christian   Laurent-Lucchetti, Jeremy   Oechslin, Manuel  

    It is often purported that unusually dry weather conditions provoke small-scale social conflict riots by intensifying the competition for water. The present paper explores this hypothesis, using data from Sub-Saharan Africa. We rely on monthly data at the cell level (0.5 x 0.5 degrees), an approach that is tailored to the short-lived and local nature of the phenomenon. Using a drought index to proxy for weather shocks, we find that a one-standard-deviation fall in the index (signaling drier conditions) raises the likelihood of riots in a given cell and month by 8.3%. We further observe that the effect of unusually dry weather conditions is substantially larger in cells with a lower availability of water resources (such as rivers and lakes), a finding that supports the significance of the competition-for-water mechanism. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    Download Collect
  • Harmful Procompetitive Effects of Trade in Presence of Credit Market Frictions

    Foellmi, Reto   Oechslin, Manuel  

    We explore the consequences of international trade in an economy that encompasses technology choice and an endogenous distribution of mark-ups due to credit market frictions. We show that in such an environment a gradual opening of trade may-but not necessarily must-have a negative impact on productivity and overall output. The reason is that the procompetitive effects of trade reduce mark-ups and hence make access to credit more difficult for smaller firms. As a result, smaller firms-while not driven out of the market-may be forced to switch to less productive technologies.
    Download Collect
  • Inequality and Growth: The Neglected Time Dimension

    Halter, Daniel   Oechslin, Manuel   Zweimüller, Josef  

    Download Collect
  • Market imperfections, wealth inequality, and the distribution of trade gains

    Foellmi, Reto   Oechslin, Manuel  

    Globalization increasingly involves less-developed countries (LDCs), i.e., economies which usually suffer from severe imperfections in their financial systems. Taking these imperfections seriously, we analyze how credit frictions affect the distributive impact of trade liberalizations. We find that free trade significantly widens income differences among firm owners in LDCs: While wealthy entrepreneurs are better off, relatively poor business people lose. Intuitively, with integrated markets, profit margins shrink which makes access to credit particularly difficult for the least-affluent agents. Richer entrepreneurs, by contrast, win because they can take advantage of new export opportunities. Our findings resonate well with a number of empirical regularities, in particular with the observation that some liberalizing LDCs have observed a surge in top-income shares. (C) 2010 Elsevier By. All rights reserved.
    Download Collect
  • Government Revenues and Economic Growth in Weakly Institutionalised States*

    Oechslin, Manuel  

    The lack of sustained growth in poor countries has often been attributed to 'fiscal weakness'. Empirical evidence suggests that governments often fail to provide crucial public goods. I argue that this failure may be the result of a political instability effect: more resources fuel power struggles among competing elites - and decrease the incumbent regime's time horizon in office. But with a shorter time horizon, it is less attractive to finance growth-promoting institutions whose returns only accrue in the future. The model further predicts the instability effect to be stronger in countries with little capital or in remote places which render technology adoption expensive.
    Download Collect
  • Why progressive redistribution can hurt the poor

    Foellmi, Reto   Oechslin, Manuel  

    Recent macroeconomic research discusses credit market imperfections as a key channel through which inequality retards growth: With convex technologies, progressive transfers increase aggregate output because marginal returns become more equalized across investment opportunities. We argue that this reasoning may not hold in general equilibrium. Since the investment functions are concave in wealth, reducing inequality increases capital demand and the interest rate. Hence, through the impact on capital costs, shifting wealth from the rich to the middle class depletes the poorest investors' access to credit. But because the poor face the highest marginal returns, the net effect on output may be negative. We find, however, that redistributing towards the bottom-end of the distribution has a clear positive impact. Finally, we discuss the implications of our theoretical findings for future empirical research. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Download Collect
  • Who gains from non-collusive corruption? RID A-2727-2008

    Foellmi, Reto   Oechslin, Manuel  

    Non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity, is particularly widespread in low-income countries. We build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption. We find that credit market imperfections, by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs, create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials. However, non-collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non-officials towards officials but also within the group of potential entrepreneurs. If borrowing is limited, bribes prevent poorer but talented individuals from starting a business. But this is likely to benefit those who may enter anyway; the cost of capital is lower and there is less competition on the goods markets. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Download Collect
  • Foreign Aid, Political Instability, and Economic Growth

    Oechslin, Manuel  

    Download Collect
  • Foreign Aid, Political Instability, and Economic Growth

    Oechslin, Manuel  

    Download Collect
  • Who Gains from Non-Collusive Corruption?

    Foellmi, Reto   Oechslin, Manuel  

    Download Collect
1

Contact

If you have any feedback, Please follow the official account to submit feedback.

Turn on your phone and scan

Submit Feedback