Koppel, Lina
Andersson, David
Vastfjall, Daniel
Tinghog, Gustav
We investigated the effect of ego depletion on risk taking. Specifically, we conducted three studies (total n=3D 1,716) to test the prediction that ego depletion results in decisions that are more strongly in line with prospect theory, i.e., that ego depletion reduces risk taking for gains, increases risk taking for losses, and increases loss aversion. Ego depletion was induced using two of the most common manipulations from previous literature: the letter 'e' task (Studies 1 and 3) and the Stroop task (Study 2). Risk taking was measured using a series of standard, incentivized economic decision-making tasks assessing risk preferences in the gain domain, risk preferences in the loss domain, and loss aversion. None of the studies revealed a significant effect of ego depletion on risk taking. Our findings cast further doubts about the ability of ego-depletion manipulations to affect actual behavior in experimental settings.
Hagger, Martin S.
Chatzisarantis, Nikos L. D.
Alberts, Hugo
Anggono, Calvin Octavianus
Batailler, Cedric
Birt, Angela R.
Brand, Ralf
Brandt, Mark J.
Brewer, Gene
Bruyneel, Sabrina
Calvillo, Dustin P.
Campbell, W. Keith
Cannon, Peter R.
Carlucci, Marianna
Carruth, Nicholas P.
Cheung, Tracy
Crowell, Adrienne
De Ridder, Denise T. D.
Dewitte, Siegfried
Elson, Malte
Evans, Jacqueline R.
Fay, Benjamin A.
Fennis, Bob M.
Finley, Anna
Francis, Zoe
Heise, Elke
Hoemann, Henrik
Inzlicht, Michael
Koole, Sander L.
Koppel, Lina
Kroese, Floor
Lange, Florian
Lau, Kevin
Lynch, Bridget P.
Martijn, Carolien
Merckelbach, Harald
Mills, Nicole V.
Michirev, Alexej
Miyake, Akira
Mosser, Alexandra E.
Muise, Megan
Muller, Dominique
Muzi, Milena
Nalis, Dario
Nurwanti, Ratri
Otgaar, Henry
Philipp, Michael C.
Primoceri, Pierpaolo
Rentzsch, Katrin
Ringos, Lara
Schlinkert, Caroline
Schmeichel, Brandon J.
Schoch, Sarah F.
Schrama, Michel
Schuetz, Astrid
Stamos, Angelos
Tinghog, Gustav
Ullrich, Johannes
vanDellen, Michelle
Wimbarti, Supra
Wolff, Wanja
Yusainy, Cleoputri
Zerhouni, Oulmann
Zwienenberg, Maria
Good self-control has been linked to adaptive outcomes such as better health, cohesive personal relationships, success in the workplace and at school, and less susceptibility to crime and addictions. In contrast, self-control failure is linked to maladaptive outcomes. Understanding the mechanisms by which self-control predicts behavior may assist in promoting better regulation and outcomes. A popular approach to understanding self-control is the strength or resource depletion model. Self-control is conceptualized as a limited resource that becomes depleted after a period of exertion resulting in self-control failure. The model has typically been tested using a sequential-task experimental paradigm, in which people completing an initial self-control task have reduced self-control capacity and poorer performance on a subsequent task, a state known as ego depletion. Although a meta-analysis of ego-depletion experiments found a medium-sized effect, subsequent meta-analyses have questioned the size and existence of the effect and identified instances of possible bias. The analyses served as a catalyst for the current Registered Replication Report of the ego-depletion effect. Multiple laboratories (k =3D 23, total N =3D 2,141) conducted replications of a standardized ego-depletion protocol based on a sequential-task paradigm by Sripada et al. Meta-analysis of the studies revealed that the size of the ego-depletion effect was small with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) that encompassed zero (d =3D 0.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.15]. We discuss implications of the findings for the ego-depletion effect and the resource depletion model of self-control.
Koppel, Lina
Andersson, David
Morrison, India
Posadzy, Kinga
Vastfjall, Daniel
Tinghog, Gustav
Pain is a highly salient and attention-demanding experience that motivates people to act. We investigated the effect of pain on decision making by delivering acute thermal pain to participants' forearm while they made risky and intertemporal choices involving money. Participants (n =3D 107) were more risk seeking under pain than in a no-pain control condition when decisions involved gains but not when they involved equivalent losses. Pain also resulted in greater preference for immediate (smaller) over future (larger) monetary rewards. We interpret these results as a motivation to offset the aversive, pain-induced state, where monetary rewards become more appealing under pain than under no pain and when delivered sooner rather than later. Our findings add to the long-standing debate regarding the role of intuition and reflection in decision making.
O'Donnell, Michael
Nelson, Leif D.
Ackermann, Evi
Aczel, Balazs
Akhtar, Athfah
Aldrovandi, Silvio
Alshaif, Nasseem
Andringa, Ronald
Aveyard, Mark
Babincak, Peter
Balatekin, Nursena
Baldwin, Scott A.
Banik, Gabriel
Baskin, Ernest
Bell, Raoul
Bialobrzeska, Olga
Birt, Angie R.
Boot, Walter R.
Braithwaite, Scott R.
Briggs, Jessie C.
Buchner, Axel
Budd, Desiree
Budzik, Kathryn
Bullens, Lottie
Bulley, Richard L.
Cannon, Peter R.
Cantarero, Katarzyna
Cesario, Joseph
Chambers, Stephanie
Chartier, Christopher R.
Chekroun, Peggy
Chong, Clara
Cleeremans, Axel
Coary, Sean P.
Coulthard, Jacob
Cramwinckel, Florien M.
Denson, Thomas F.
Diaz-Lago, Marcos
DiDonato, Theresa E.
Drummond, Aaron
Eberlen, Julia
Ebersbach, Titus
Edlund, John E.
Finnigan, Katherine M.
Fisher, Justin
Frankowska, Natalia
Garcia-Sanchez, Efrain
Golom, Frank D.
Graves, Andrew J.
Greenberg, Kevin
Hanioti, Mando
Hansen, Heather A.
Harder, Jenna A.
Harrell, Erin R.
Hartanto, Andree
Inzlicht, Michael
Johnson, David J.
Karpinski, Andrew
Keller, Victor N.
Klein, Olivier
Koppel, Lina
Krahmer, Emiel
Lantian, Anthony
Larson, Michael J.
Legal, Jean-Baptiste
Lucas, Richard E.
Lynott, Dermot
Magaldino, Corey M.
Massar, Karlijn
McBee, Matthew T.
McLatchie, Neil
Melia, Nadhilla
Mensink, Michael C.
Mieth, Laura
Moore-Berg, Samantha
Neeser, Geraldine
Newell, Ben R.
Noordewier, Marret K.
Ozdogru, Asil Ali
Pantazi, Myrto
Parzuchowski, Michal
Peters, Kim
Philipp, Michael C.
Pollmann, Monique M. H.
Rentzelas, Panagiotis
Rodriguez-Bailon, Rosa
Roeer, Jan Philipp
Ropovik, Ivan
Roque, Nelson A.
Rueda, Carolina
Rutjens, Bastiaan T.
Sackett, Katey
Salamon, Janos
Sanchez-Rodriguez, Angel
Saunders, Blair
Schaafsma, Juliette
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Michael
Shanks, David R.
Sherman, Martin F.
Steele, Kenneth M.
Steffens, Niklas K.
Sun, Jessie
Susa, Kyle J.
Szaszi, Barnabas
Szollosi, Aba
Tamayo, Ricardo M.
Tinghog, Gustav
Tong, Yuk-yue
Tweten, Carol
Vadillo, Miguel A.
Valcarcel, Deisy
Van der Linden, Nicolas
van Elk, Michiel
van Harreveld, Frenk
Vastfjall, Daniel
Vazire, Simine
Verduyn, Philippe
Williams, Matt N.
Willis, Guillermo B.
Wood, Sarah E.
Yang, Chunliang
Zerhouni, Oulmann
Zheng, Robert
Zrubka, Mark
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) reported that participants primed with a category associated with intelligence (professor) subsequently performed 13% better on a trivia test than participants primed with a category associated with a lack of intelligence (soccer hooligans). In two unpublished replications of this study designed to verify the appropriate testing procedures, Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, and Holland observed a smaller difference between conditions (2%-3%) as well as a gender difference: Men showed the effect (9.3% and 7.6%), but women did not (0.3% and -0.3%). The procedure used in those replications served as the basis for this multilab Registered Replication Report. A total of 40 laboratories collected data for this project, and 23 of these laboratories met all inclusion criteria. Here we report the meta-analytic results for those 23 direct replications (total N =3D 4,493), which tested whether performance on a 30-item general-knowledge trivia task differed between these two priming conditions (results of supplementary analyses of the data from all 40 labs, N =3D 6,454, are also reported). We observed no overall difference in trivia performance between participants primed with the professor category and those primed with the hooligan category (0.14%) and no moderation by gender.
Andersson, David
Bonn, Caroline
Johannesson, Magnus
Kirchler, Michael
Koppel, Lina
Vastfjall, Daniel
Do individuals intuitively favor certain moral actions over others? This study explores the role of intuitive thinking D induced by time pressure and cognitive load D in moral judgment and behavior. We conduct experiments in three different countries (Sweden, Austria, and the United States) involving over 1,400 subjects. All subjects responded to four trolley type dilemmas and four dictator games involving different charitable causes. Decisions were made under time pressure/time delay or while experiencing cognitive load or control. Overall we find converging evidence that intuitive states do not influence moral decisions. Neither time-pressure nor cognitive load had any effect on moral judgments or altruistic behavior. Thus we find no supporting evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and dictator game giving differ from more reflectively taken decisions. Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making. However, there were no significant interactions between gender and the treatment manipulations of intuitive versus reflective decision-making.
Koppel, Lina
Andersson, David
Morrison, India
Vastfjall, Daniel
Tinghog, Gustav
Pleasant touch is thought to increase the release of oxytocin. Oxytocin, in turn, has been extensively studied with regards to its effects on trust and prosocial behavior, but results remain inconsistent. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of touch on economic decision making. Participants (n =3D 120) were stroked on their left arm using a soft brush (touch condition) or not at all (control condition; varied within subjects), while they performed a series of decision tasks assessing betrayal aversion (the Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task), altruism (donating money to a charitable organization), and risk taking (the Balloon Analog Risk Task). We found no significant effect of touch on any of the outcome measures, neither within nor between subjects. Furthermore, effects were not moderated by gender or attachment. However, attachment avoidance had a significant effect on altruism in that those who were high in avoidance donated less money. Our findings contribute to the understanding of affective touch-and, by extension, oxytocin-in social behavior, and decision making by showing that touch does not directly influence performance in tasks involving risk and prosocial decisions. Specifically, our work casts further doubt on the validity of oxytocin research in humans.