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Now showing items 33 - 39 of 39

  • On the price of anarchy in a single-server queue with heterogeneous service valuations induced by travel costs

    Hassin, Refael   Nowik, Irit   Shaki, Yair Y.  

    This work presents a strategic observable model where customer heterogeneity is induced by the customers' locations and travel costs. The arrival of customers with distances less than x is assumed to be Poisson with rate equal to the integral from 0 to x, of a nonnegative intensity function h. In a loss system M/G/1/1 we define the threshold Nash equilibrium strategy x(e) and the socially-optimal threshold strategy x*. We investigate the dependence of the price of anarchy (PoA) on the parameter xe and the intensity function. For example, if the potential arrival rate is bounded then PoA is bounded and converges to 1 when xe goes to infinity. On the other hand, if the potential arrival rate is unbounded, we prove that x*/x(e) always goes to 0, when x, goes to infinity and yet, in some cases PoA is bounded and even converges to 1; if h converges to a positive constant then PoA converges to 2; if h increases then the limit of PoA is at least 2, whereas if h decreases then PoA is bounded and the limit of PoA is at most 2. In a system with a queue we prove that PoA may be unbounded already in the simplest case of uniform arrival. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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  • On the price of anarchy in a single-server queue with heterogeneous service valuations induced by travel costs

    Hassin, Refael   Nowik, Irit   Shaki, Yair Y.  

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  • Equilibrium strategies and the value of information in a two line queueing system with threshold jockeying

    Hassin, Refael   Haviv, Moshe  

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  • On Shortest Paths in Graphs with Random Weights

    Hassin, Refael   Zemel, Eitan  

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  • An $O(n\\log ^2 n)$ Algorithm for Maximum Flow in Undirected Planar Networks

    Hassin, Refael   Johnson, Donald B.  

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  • Approximation algorithms for the geometric covering salesman problem : Esther M. Arkin and Refael Hassin Discrete Applied Mathematics Vol. 55, 1994, pp. 197–218

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  • Equilibrium and optimal one-shot delegated search

    Hassin, Refael  

    A target is located at one of m given sites, with known probabilities. Each of a set of searchers selects a site to search, and a fixed prize is shared by those who search the correct location. What (symmetric) search strategies are adopted when the searchers act selfishly to maximize their expected returns, and how can a firm affect this behavior to increase the efficiency of the search? This is a common situation when, for example, a firm faces a time-limited business opportunity. To materialize it the firm must solve a design problem that it delegates to a limited number of experts, and sets up a contest in order to motivate them to search for the solution. The firm is interested in maximizing the probability that the problem is solved by at least one of the searchers. Other applications include mathematical contests, innovation contests, and ?guess & win? contests. We investigate the searchers? incentives and how they conform with the firm?s goal. We analyze the equilibrium selection strategies and the strategies that maximize the probability that the search is successful and the target is discovered by at least one searcher. We show that selfish (equilibrium) search leaves too many sites unsearched while searching excessively the high-probability locations. We analyze the relative loss caused when the equilibrium search strategy is applied rather than the optimal one, and show that even with just two sites, it can be as large as 20%. We present two methods for inducing the optimal strategy in equilibrium, one uses heterogeneous prizes while the other one does not use direct monetary incentives. Awareness of the gap between agents? incentives and firm?s goals should direct a principal when deciding whether it is desirable to delegate the search for a design problem, and if so then how to provide adequate incentives.
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