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Customers' strategic behavior in batch arrivals M-2/M/1 queue

Author:
Ziani, Sofiane  Rahmoune, Fazia  Radjef, Mohammed Said  


Journal:
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH


Issue Date:
2015


Abstract(summary):

The investigated problem is the analysis of customers' strategic behavior in a single server Markovian M-2/M/1 queue with batch arrivals of two customers with a reward-cost structure. At their arrival time, customers can decide to join the queue or to balk. The utility of each one depends on his decision, on his partner's decision and on the system state. Two cases are considered: when the system provides the information about its state (observable case), and when this information is not provided (unobservable case). Both problems are modeled as games in extensive form with complete and imperfect information. We give the Nash equilibria for each corresponding game and we compare between both cases in order to determine the policy which arranges the system's manager. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. and Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO) within the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS). All rights reserved.


Page:
895---903


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