Cambodia and Sri Lanka are two tiny states where China has no major strategic stakes. Yet China has been a key regime ally to both regimes at a critical moment during the alleged genocides of 1975-1979 in Cambodia and of 2009 in Sri Lanka. While the failure of Western interventionist peace-building models has been widely discussed, the patterns and outcomes of Chinese non-intervention have not. How did China's scrupulous respect for non-intervention affect the alleged genocides? The article supports the viewpoint that Chinese non-interference in both states was built on the notion that the building of an independent nation was a top priority in securing sovereignty, order and unity. Hence, China focused on bilateral military aid and economic development, whilst shielding both governments from external scrutiny and international accountability during and after the alleged genocides. China has since made efforts to address and resolve national conflicts through concerted United Nations (UN) procedures and mechanisms.

Japan has great knowledge and state-of-the-art systems in place to face tsunami risk. Nevertheless, after the 3/11 Tohoku tsunami disaster, plans have been reviewed nationwide to strengthen tsunami preparedness in the event of a mega-tsunami. This article supports the opinion that despite improvements and progress made in risk assessment, tsunami disaster mitigation planning faces great challenges in securing mass evacuation. Findings of a field interview survey conducted among local residents supplemented by a thorough review of local risk-assessment policies and disaster-management plans suggest that residents do not believe that they are sufficiently prepared to escape a mega-tsunami despite very advanced risk-control systems. The reasons for this are two-fold: first, local autonomy is hampered by top-down prefectural and national interference, and second, realistic response planning for if the protective measures fail has not been sufficiently enforced.

In Myanmar, hostilities between the majority Burmese and the minority Rakhine people on one side and the minority Rohingya on the other side have been common, but violence has persisted and even increased during the unstable transition away from an authoritarian regime. Most Burmese citizens appear to be united behind the ruling elites on the Rohingya issue. Why is the violence assumed to be of ethnic origin and whose interests are served by the acceptance of such violent acts as routine events? The article attempts to seek answers by following Brass's framework on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Its purpose is to examine which actors, mechanisms and institutional developments have been dominant and significant in the re-ethnicisation of the political landscape in Myanmar and how this has consolidated the formation of a contentious and contested specific Rohingya group identity among many Arakanese Muslims.