Presents an interview conducted with Marshall Greenspan whose expertise is in the field of radar engineering.

The aim of this paper is to examine whether the Federal Reserve chair has influenced the voting behaviour of the Reserve Bank Presidents. In view of data constraints, the present empirical analysis focuses on Alan Greenspan's chairmanship. Individual Taylor-type reaction functions for the Federal Reserve Districts are estimated using Presidents' interest rate preferences voiced during the second round of the internal FOMC discussions and real-time data. They show that the Federal Reserve Bank Presidents did not systematically deviate from the Chairman's reaction function. In addition, a bootstrap analysis finds that the second-round preferences of these members appear to have been influenced by a consensus enhancing factor. Overall, the empirical evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the notion that Chairman Greenspan has influenced the Reserve Bank Presidents in their voting behaviour when achieving a consensus on interest rates. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

This paper implements an affine term structure model that accommodates "unspanned" macro risks for the Euro area, i. e. distinct from yield-curve risks. I use an averaging-estimator approach to obtain a better estimation of the historical dynamics of the pricing factors, thus pro- viding more accurate estimates of the term premium incorporated into the Eurozone's sovereign yield curve. I then look for episodes of the monetary cycle where long yields display a puzzling behavior vis-à-vis the short rate and its expected average path in contrast with the Expectation Hypothesis. The Euro-area bond market appears to have gone through its own "Greenspan conundrum" between January 1999 and August 2008. The term premium substantially con- tributed to these odd phenomena.

This paper implements an affine term structure model that accommodates "unspanned" macro risks for the Euro area, i. e. distinct from yield-curve risks. I use a Near-Cointegrated VAR-like approach to obtain a better estimation of the historical dynamics of the pricing factors, thus providing more accurate estimates of the term premium incorporated into the Eurozone's sovereign yield curve. I then look for episodes of the monetary cycle where long yields display a puzzling behavior vis-à-vis the short rate and its expected average path in contrast with the Expectation Hypothesis. The Euro-area bond market appears to have gone through its own "Greenspan conundrum" between January 1999 and August 2008. The term premium substantially contributed to these odd phenomena.

This paper traces the evolution of US central bank transparency and provides new evidence bearing on the question of whether the Fed has become more transparent in recent years. Before Alan Greenspan, who eventually became a grudging advocate of transparency, Federal Reserve Board chairmen typically prized secrecy over transparency. Ben Bernanke's empirical research led him to conclude that transparency actually enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy. Our original empirical approach incorporates reaction functions in comparing how the FOMC responds to a set of macroeconomic stimuli vs. how the futures market responds to the same variables. The evidence suggests that the Fed was not very transparent in the early Greenspan years, but became progressively transparent through Greenspan's later period and into the early, pre-crisis, Bernanke era.

This paper implements an affine term structure model that accommodates "unspanned" macro risks for the Euro area, i. e. distinct from yield-curve risks. I use a Near-Cointegrated VAR-like approach to obtain a better estimation of the historical dynamics of the pricing factors, thus providing more accurate estimates of the term premium incorporated into the Eurozone's sovereign yield curve. I then look for episodes of the monetary cycle where long yields display a puzzling behavior vis-` a-vis the short rate and its expected average path in contrast with the Expectation Hypothesis. The Euro-area bond market appears to have gone through its own "Greenspan conundrum" between January 1999 and August 2008. The term premium substantially contributed to these odd phenomena.

This paper traces the evolution of US central bank transparency and provides new evidence bearing on the question of whether the Fed has become more transparent in recent years. Before Alan Greenspan, who eventually became a grudging advocate of transparency, Federal Reserve Board chairmen typically prized secrecy over transparency. Ben Bernanke's empirical research led him to conclude that transparency actually enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy. Our original empirical approach incorporates reaction functions in comparing how the FOMC responds to a set of macroeconomic stimuli vs. how the futures market responds to the same variables. The evidence suggests that the Fed was not very transparent in the early Greenspan years, but became progressively transparent through Greenspan's later period and into the early, pre-crisis, Bernanke era.

This article addresses the issue of Phillips Curve stability between different Federal Reserve (Fed) chairmen, from the time Paul Volcker took office in the late 1970s all the way up until 2010 under the leadership of Ben Bernanke. Phillips Curves are estimated both across and within the regimes of Volcker, Greenspan and Bernanke, and thereafter we also check for the existence of potential structural breaks. The results suggest that the Phillips Curve is very much a robust macroeconomic relationship: not only across time, but across Fed chairmen as well.